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PARENTAL LEAVE AND AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM
Saul Levmoret
INTRODUCTION
Why does the United States have one of the least generous parental
leave policies in the world? What will the future of our parental leave
policies look like? It is often the case that understanding current
policy is a means toward predicting future policies. Moreover, change
seems most likely in areas where a country's policies differ so from
those found elsewhere.
In the case of parental leave, cross-country comparisons are
certainly startling. In the United States, employees of firms subject to
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 are entitled to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave in the event of the birth or adoption of a child.1
Essentially, the employee's position must be held open, or a
comparable one supplied upon return to the workplace.2 The
employer may choose to provide some pay for the period the leave,
and in the case of a mother who gives birth, disability coverage will
surely come into play,3 but there is otherwise no mandated or state-
t Dean & William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am
grateful for research assistance provided by Elizabeth Eldridge and Timothy Cleary, and for the
hospitality and ideas I enjoyed when delivering an earlier version of this project, "Parental
Leave and Other Embarrassments," as The Sumner Canary Lecture at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
I Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601, 2611 (1994) (providing for a
single 12 week period within 12 months of triggering event, including birth of a child, as well as
adoption or serious medical matters).
2 Id
3 See Arielle Horman Grill, The Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States
Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model?, 17 CoMw. LAB. L.J. 373, 378
(1996) (discussing options for supplementing the FMLA leave, including taking accumulated
sick leave or, in some jurisdictions, utilizing disability insurance).
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provided compensation for the lost wages. In fact, some employers
provide paid leave that is very generous by international standards,
but most of the American work force takes extended parental leave at
its cost, if no longer at its peril. The apparent cost may, of course, be
offset by higher wages or other benefits, but it is not obvious why the
bargain between employers and employees, even as influenced by
law, would lead to so much of this fringe benefit in most countries
and so little in the United States. Outside of the United States, paid
parental leave is nearly universal, though it comes in different forms.
In Part I, I offer some description of the variety found around the
world. Part II takes up the question of what explains the variety, or
simply the presence of very generous leave policies in some
countries. Part III returns to American exceptionalism and considers
the "two-tier" provision of benefits, such that employers sometimes
offer a subset of employees benefits that are more generous than those
received by other employees. There is the possibility that benefits
provided in this two-tier fashion affect the politics of mandated and
government-provided benefits. Part IV then turns to the future of
parental leave. I suggest that universal paid leave is not to be expected
in the United States, and that employers may soon prefer to subsidize
child-care benefits because of the likely effects on employee
retention.
I. CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
In the United States, most employees' jobs are protected for a
single twelve-week period taken within twelve months of the birth of
a child, adoption or serious medical matter.4 In California, state law
provides for six weeks of paid leave, with the new parent receiving
55% of pay up to a maximum of $882 per week.5 An employee who
uses the twelve weeks of federally required, but unpaid, leave, will
find that half those weeks are (fractionally) compensated in California
but not in other states - unless the employer chooses to offer such a
benefit.6 In other countries, jobs must also be held open, but the
employee on leave is also paid in whole or in part, either by the
government or by legally bound employers. Moreover, the benefit is,
in nominal terms, everywhere more extensive.7 Thus, Sweden offers
4 Family and Medical Leave Act, supra, note 1.
Employment Development Department, http://www.edd.ca.gov/direp/pflfaql.asp (last
visited Aug. 6, 2007) (explaining the particulars of the California Paid Family Leave Act).
6 See generally Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps
Towards Effective Policies, 8 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 1 (2006) (comparing California's family leave
laws to the federal family leave law).
"Nominal terms" because any leave, paid or unpaid, mandated or not, may be offset by
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390 days at 80% pay (up to a ceiling) for birth parents, followed by
ninety days of payment at a fixed, low rate.8 These 480 days of leave
are mandatory for employer and employee, and sixty of these days
must be taken by the other parent.9 In other words, one parent takes
more than a year of paid leave, and at some point the other takes two
months. The fact that the employee must take leave can be seen as
either remarkably intrusive by American standards, or rather as
aiming to avoid situations where employees wish to take leave but
feel compelled by formal or informal workplace pressures to be at
work. Norway offers the parent-employee a choice of forty-four
weeks at 100% pay or fifty-four weeks at 80% pay.' 0 Italy offers 80%
pay for five months." In the United Kingdom, there are six weeks of
90% paid leave with no ceiling, followed by thirty-three weeks at a
fixed level, comparable to worker's compensation.
2
As these few examples illustrate, paid parental leave is an
ambiguous expression because of caps and fractions. Some countries
offer full pay or a large fraction only up to a specified amount
(usually an amount comparable to that paid to civil servants), and
some provide no upper bound. We are at first impressed to learn that
Tanzania offers paid leave when the United States does not, 13 but
when we intuit that employers often avoid the law, and see that even
when they pay, it is fractional pay up to a cap that is worth very little
in terms of living standards and costs in developed nations, the
comparison is less remarkable. 14 All told, only a very few legal
systems offer full pay for a significant period to what we would think
of as highly paid employees, but very many countries promise or
guarantee significant pay to most employees. In some countries this is
a decrease in other benefits or simply by lower wages.
8 Ingela Bjork, The Best Place for Mothers?, SCIENCE, Jan. 9, 2004, available at
http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career-development/previous-issues/articles/2800/the-bes
tplace for mothers.
9 Id,
10 Norwegian Fathers Choose Paternity Leave, Norway: The Official Site in Tanzania,
Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.norway.go.tz/policy/children/welfare/patemityleave.htm.
11 Press Release, International Labour Organization, More Than 120 Nations Provide
Maternity Leave Feb. 16, 1998), http://www.ilo.org/global/About-theILO/
Media and public information/Pressreleases/lang--en/WCMS 008009.
12 Department for Work and Pensions-Services and Benefits: Statutory Maternity Pay,
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/benefits/statutory_maternity_pay.asp#workedout (last visited
Jul. 12, 2007).
13 Jody Heymann, et al. The Work, Family, and Equity Index: Where Does the United
States Stand Globally?, THE PROJECT ON GLOBAL WORKING FAMILIES (Harvard University,
Boston, Mass.), 2004 at 31.
14 For an account of widespread fraud in Tanzania, see Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Fighting
Fiscal Corruption: The Case of the Tanzania Revenue Authority, (Christian Michelsen Inst.,
Working Paper No. 3, 2002).
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required of the employer, in some it is paid for by the state, and, in
many, the state and employer share the cost. The social insurance, or
state payor, scheme is common in Europe, where the paid leaves are
funded by ongoing payments from workers, employers, and the
state-much like our social security. 15 China, Indonesia, and other
countries have, instead, adopted employer-funded payment
schemes.' 6 The employer-funded schemes raise questions of employer
noncompliance, retaliation, and even chill in employment, but
enforcement issues and strategies are beyond the scope of this article.
The variety among jurisdictions extends to the treatment of fathers,
but there is uniformity in the sense of a maternal-paternal distinction.
Many countries offer some paternal leave, and a fair number offer
such leave with pay. But there is universal discrimination against
what we might call the secondary caregiver. For example, France
offers mothers paid leave for sixteen weeks at 100% of their previous
earnings.' 7 French fathers, in stark contrast, receive two weeks of paid
leave.' 8 At last count, 169 countries guaranteed some paid parental-
perhaps better described as maternal in this context, 19 with sixty-six
of these countries guaranteeing some paid paternal leave.2°
II. EXPLAINING THE VARIETY IN PARENTAL LEAVE
A. Parental Leave as Welfare Policy
One way to explain the variety in countries' parental leave policies
is to begin with the relatively meager policies found in the United
States. In other words, what explains the fact that such a wealthy
nation has, what we might estimate to be, the 170 th "best" parental
leave policy in the world? A simple but unsatisfactory answer is that
this absent benefit or mandate is in line with the United States's more
general inclination to provide less of a safety net than do other
countries. Many or most American voters and politicians would not
be proud to be associated with the expansion of the "welfare state."
15 See International Labour Organization, supra note 11.
16 International Labour Organization, supra note 11.
17 Sheila B. Kamerman, An Overview of ECEC Developments in the OECD Countries, in
EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 13, 20 (Sheila B.
Kamerman ed., 2001).
Is International Labour Organization: Conditions of Work and Employment Programme,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/condtrav/family/reconcilwf/specialleave.htm (last
visited Jul. 2, 2007).
19 Jody Heymann et al., The Work, Family, and Equity Index: How Does the United States
Measure Up?, THE PROJECT ON GLOBAL WORKING FAMILIES (Inst. for Health and Social Pol'y,
Montreal, QC), 2007, at 1.
20 Id. at 2.
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However, this answer is inadequate because many less developed
nations offer little in the way of safety nets, but do much more than
the United States for the typical employee whose job is interrupted by
childbirth. And even if this were not the case, the welfare-versus-
laissez-faire picture is inaccurate, because the United States mandates
expensive accommodations for disabled persons, 1  imposes
occupational safety rules22 and environmental controls that are
expensive 23 and, arguably redistributive and expends considerable
resources in relative terms on education and health care. Unpaid
parental leave does stand out in this broader context. If we think of
welfare policy as including employer mandates that force some
redistribution, as well as public programs that are supported by tax
revenues, then the United States is hardly at the low end of a ranking
of the world's welfare states. It may be so in terms of benefits or the
value of redistributed services as a fraction of GNP, and the country's
reliance on, or confidence in, private markets does likely rank near
the top. Still, the complete absence of mandated or state-supported
parental leave is notable.
B. Parental Leave as Fertility Policy
The best way to understand our parental leave practices is as a
recruitment technique at the employer level and, more immediately,
as a fertility and economic growth policy at the federal level.
Employer policies will be taken up presently. As for macroeconomic
policy, the critical fact is that the United States has a robust fertility
rate of 2.09,24 which is barely above the replacement rate of 2.01 .25
But the United States also has a seemingly endless line of immigrants
at its borders, with a current immigration rate of 3.05 migrants per
1000 population.26 This is not the forum in which to discuss economic
growth and population rates, but it is plain that a declining population
generates serious problems for a country's retirement system as well
21 See Michael A. Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 89, 91 fi. 89
(2007).
22 See U.S. Department of Labor: Occupational Safety & Health Administration,
http://www.osha.gov/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
23 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/ (last visited Aug. 7,
2007).
24 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book-United States,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.hhfl#People (last visited
Jul. 7, 2007). The discussion in the text assumes that replacement rate is close to the goal that
most advanced economies would set.
25 Jonathan Bradshaw et al., Can Policy Influence Fertility, SOC. SEC. AND LABOUR MKT.
IN AN AGING SOC'Y (Int'l Research Seminar Found. for Int'l Studies in Soc. Sec.) Jun. 13, 2005,
available at http://www-users.york.ac.uk/-jrbl/documents/CP2082FISS11i.pdf.
26 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book-United States, supra note 24.
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as its future growth. With a fertility rate that is relatively high for
developed countries, and with robust immigration-and the ability to
increase the flow of immigrants almost at will-the United States has
no reason to try to increase fertility with payments to parents, or
through mandated workplace policies. This is obviously not the only
reason one might expect, or vote for, paid parental leave, but it is one
reason, and the suggestion here is that it is the best explanation of the
variety that is found.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Scandinavian countries have
remarkably generous parental leave policies, 27 and relatively low
birthrates. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have fertility rates
(children born per woman) of 1.74, 1.78, and 1.66, respectively.28
They seem to have fewer ready immigrants, but they certainly have a
domestic political climate-or simply preferences-more averse to
immigration than that found in the United States.29 The evidence is so
striking that there is no need to engage in extensive data analysis.
Low fertility rates are associated with generous parental leave.
Immigration rates (and the apparent ability to increase those rates)
add to the picture. 30 One is tempted to say that the prospect of under-
population generates aggressive parental leaves, but I prefer a more
neutral description. Low fertility also means that parental leave
policies are less expensive; fertility policies may be regarded as
ineffective; and parental leave and fertility rates may be affected by a
third variable. But the association between low fertility rates and
generous parental leave can, in any event, be said to "explain" the
American law. There is, as already implied, no shortage of examples
confirming this connection. Ireland and Canada also have relatively
high birth rates, at least for developed countries, 31 and more modest
27 Swedish Parental Leave: Forced Fatherhood, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2004, available
at http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=2335623.
28 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook-Denmark, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/da.html#People (last visited Jul. 7, 2007) (for
information on Denmark); Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook-Norway,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/no.html#People (last visted Jul. 7,
2007) (for information on Norway); and Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook-
Sweden, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/sw.html#People (last
visited Jul. 7, 2007) (for information on Sweden).
29 See sources cited supra note 28 (for immigration rates of the Scandanavian countries);
Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook-United States, supra note 24 (for
immigration rates of the United States).
30 With regard to fertility rates, see generally Anne Helene Gautheir et al., Family Benefits
and Fertility: An Econometric Analysis, POPULATION STUDIES: A JOURNAL OF DEMOGRAPHY
295 (1997); see also Jan M. Hoem, Public Policy as the Fuel of Fertility: Effects of a Policy
Reform on the Pace of Childbearing in Sweden in the 1980s, ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 19, 27 (1993).
31 See Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook-reland, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/ir.html#People (last visited Jul. 7, 2007) (for
information on Ireland); Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook--Canada,
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32benefits than most other countries with high GNP per capita.
Canada provides fifteen weeks of employer- paid maternity leave
followed by thirty-five weeks of employment insurance, available as
parental leave to both parents, with payment of 55% of earnings up to
a cap of $413 (Canadian) per week.33 Italy has a very low fertility rate
of 1.29 34 and a most generous maternity leave policy.
35
Perhaps the most striking example of parental leave as fertility
policy is found in Bulgaria, where the low fertility rate of 1.3936 is a
problem compounded by a negative migration rate.37 As we might
(now) expect, Bulgaria, though not especially wealthy or inclined to
redistribution, is at the high end of generous parental leave. It
provides forty-five days paid sick leave before birth, then 270 days of
paid maternity leave after birth, and then two years of paid parental
38 heleave. A mother has the option of transferring this maternity benefit
to the father or to a grandparent. 39 The employer must hold the job
open for (these) three years.40
The straightforward explanation of this inverse relationship
between fertility rates and parental leave policies is that countries
need future citizens in order to provide for current residents' old age
and in order to ensure continued economic investment. If a nation
lacks births and immigrants, we can expect larger subsidies for births,
whether in the form of tax exemptions or parental leave or other
benefits highly or even perfectly correlated with births. This is an
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ca.html#People (last visited Jul. 7,
2007) (for information on Canada).
32 See Human Resources and Social Development Canada: Maternity, Parental, and
Adoption Leaves, http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/wlb/wfp/1 lMatemityLeave.shtml#62
(last visited Jul. 12, 2007) (describing benefits that are relatively generous only to low earners);
see Irish Maternity Benefits, http://www.baby-parenting.co.uk/pregnancy/maternityleave.html
(last visited Jul. 12, 2007).
33 Human Resources and Social Development Canada: Maternity, Parental and Adoption
Leaves, supra note 32.
34 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book-Italy, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html#People (last visited Jul. 7, 2007).
35 See International Labor Organization, supra note 11 (Italy provides five months of
maternity leave).
36 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book-Bulgaria,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html#People (last visited
Jul. 7, 2007).
37 Id.
38 The European Job Mobility Portal: Bulgaria Family and Maternity Benefits,
http://ec.europa.eu/eures/main.jsp?lang-en&catld--9054&acro=living&countryId=BG (last
visited Jul. 12, 2003).
39 Id.
4 See The European Job Mobility Portal: Bulgaria Leave, http://ec.europa.eu/
eures/main.jsp?lang--en&catld=8427&acro=living&countryld=BG (last visited Jul. 12, 2007).
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important explanation, though it is not original, except perhaps for the
addition of immigration into the equation.
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, paid parental leave can be
seen as an insurance scheme. This sort of alternative may be attractive
if the fertility-immigration explanation seems implausible, perhaps
because of the view that countries are nothing more than collections
of citizens who are not known for their rational, collective long-term
planning. That these countries are guided by politicians with short-
term re-election goals, or with present-day interest groups in mind,
does not help the case for linking parental leave policies to fertility
rates. If we think of countries as focused on the short run, rather than
on influencing birth rates, it is natural to think of parental leave
policies as responding to citizens' aversion to the high or even
unexpectedly high opportunity costs of parenting. One problem with
this insurance explanation is that it is difficult to see how it would
explain variety across countries, especially because many poor
countries offer parental leave. Another is that government-provided
insurance seems unlikely to emerge in countries where most of the
population believes in advance that it will lose more than it will gain
from the plan. On the other hand, with a relatively homogenous
population, and perhaps especially with low fertility rates, there may
be little fear of substantial and predictable cross-subsidies. If every
couple in Sweden has two children, and all women work before
giving birth, then generous parental leave simply amounts to the mild
form of insurance we often call forced savings or, for most people,
borrowing. Most women will have children early in their working
lives when they would not yet have saved much. In fact, the number
of women in Sweden with three or more children is very low.41 The
number with four or more is remarkably low. And the number of
these unusual women who also remain in the work force in order to
receive benefits associated with the third or fourth child is so low that
there is little likelihood of resentment or strong opposition from the
median voter.
But why would people in Sweden, or around the world, prefer this
insurance (or save-and-borrow) system to so many other pooling
schemes they do not bother to form? Put differently, in a
heterogeneous population there would be opposition to this insurance,
and in a homogeneous population it hardly seems worth the
transaction costs. The answer may be that perceptions are distorted
41 Gunnar Anderson, A Study on Policies and Practices in Selected Countries that
Encourage Childbirth: The Case of Sweden 19 (Max Planck Inst for Demographic Research,
Working Paper No. 2005-005).
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where this benefit is concerned. Significantly, when asked about their
expected number of children, even Swedes have for many years
overestimated their fertility, answering two, three, or four-though
accurate responses would be zero, one, or two.42 It is possible,
therefore, that they would individually welcome a paid parental leave
benefit, or insurance plan, because most participants (and voters)
expect to benefit more than they would pay in taxes or foregone
wages. Even if we assume that their governments are aware of the
overestimates, there is no need to forestall that which is politically
attractive. As it turns out, Sweden is not alone in individual
overestimates. Even in less developed countries with birth rates above
5.0, women expect or "want" more children than they actually
produce. Overestimation may well be universal, and parental leave
policies may track this optimism. An important part of the
homogeneity argument is that incomes are homogeneous along with
fertility, for otherwise even if all voters expect to benefit as often,
some will be opposed to paying taxes that support income
replacement for higher-earning beneficiaries. In short, it is low
variance in birth rates and income that might produce generous
parental leaves. And as for American exceptionalism, with unpaid
leave as the norm, the population is somewhat heterogeneous as to
birth rates and famously so as to income.43 Together these might offer
a robust explanation, or additional explanation, for the near absence
of mandatory paid parental leaves.
I have already suggested that fertility policies are notoriously
ineffective. The Scandinavian encouragements have not brought
about high fertility rates in those countries, though we do not know
what these would be in the absence of the sometimes enviable
policies. 44 It is likely that payments, whether in the form of paid
parental leave or other currency, make more difference in low-income
countries or for low-income citizens in various countries. This is
especially so if the observed leave policies have caps on earnings that
will be recovered during leave time. We know to associate affluence
with lower birth rates,45 but that is not inconsistent with the idea that
the non-affluent, or even the affluent, might be responsive to
incentives for childbearing. There are many low-income countries
42 Massimo Livi Bacci, Comment: Desired Family Size and the Future of Course of
Fertility, 27 POPULATION AND DEVEL. REv. 282,285 (2001) at 285.
43 Bernard Guyer et al., Annual Summary of Vital Statistics: Trends in the Health of
Americans in the During the 20'4 Century, 106 PEDIATRICS 1307, 1310 (2000).
4 See sources cited supra note 30 (showing that the birthrates of the Scandanavian
countries have not increased).
45 Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 THE Q.J. OF
EcoN. 407 (1991).
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with relatively generous parental leave and payment policies,46 but
even here a reasonable conjecture is that the impact of paid parental
leave on fertility rates is modest at best because most net wages, and
certainly civil service wages and earnings caps, are low. We rarely
observe a truly aggressive policy in a low-income country, but of
course these countries generally have high fertility rates and therefore
more of an inclination to lower, rather than to raise, these rates. Even
if there were such a country, it might implicitly use a high discount
rate, valuing the near-term much more than the distant future, and
defer long-term anxieties to the future when there is some possibility
that good fortune will provide for political and economic stability and
the luxury of considering long-term needs. Finally, it is noteworthy
that here and there where a truly aggressive policy is tried, as it was in
Communist-era Romania, it remains astonishingly difficult to raise
birth rates, though confounding varlables surely come into play.47
The preceding discussion raises the question of why countries that
want to lower their birth rates would subsidize fertility at all. One
possibility is that the insurance-borrowing explanation is a better fit;
another is that they aim to promote better child-rearing or another aim
ignored thus far. The presence of another goal would make it easier to
explain the variety that is found around the world, and especially the
North American reality of modestly paid and unpaid leave. Moreover,
parental leave can be withdrawn so that it is something of a stick as
well as a carrot. Consider the important case of China, which
famously seeks to reduce fertility, 48 or at least maintain its current,
hard-earned, 1.75 level.49 China offers relatively generous parental
leave, albeit with uneven enforcement.50 But the critical piece of the
puzzle is that the leave is given only to couples whose pregnancies
were approved. The state rewards those who abide by its family
planning rules.5 In this regard, it is noteworthy that paid leave is
available for abortion as well as childbirth, though the abortion must,
46 See, e.g., The European Job Mobility Portal: Bulgaria Family and Maternity Benefits,
supra note 39 (discussing Bulgaria's policy toward generous parental leave).
47 See generally Ovidiu Gavrilovici, Past and Present of Total Institutions: Romania as a
Case Study, CHILD INCLUSION (European Commission: Community Action Programme to
Combat Social Exclusion, Florence, Italy), May 5, 2007 available at
http://childinclusion.istitutodeglinnocenti.it/down/florence/Ovidiu-Romania.pdf.
48 See Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1044 (1996).
49 Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book-China, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#People, (last visited Jul. 13, 2007).
50 International Labour Organization, supra note 11.
51 Lawrence W. Green, Promoting the One-Child Policy in China, 9 J. OF PUB. HEALTH
POL'Y, 273,277 (1988).
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again, follow a pregnancy for which a permit was obtained as part of
the "planned pregnancy" program.
52
C. The Limits of Fertility Policy
It is likely that there is a subsidy or leave policy that would raise
fertility rates. That we do not observe such generous leave policies, or
other subsidies, may be a reminder that immigration is an available,
and often cheaper, substitute. It is also likely, though politically
incorrect to suggest, that countries fear that higher subsidies will raise
fertility among, or only among, low-income groups. It is one thing to
want a cross-section of families to have more births, or perhaps a
cross-section of women to marry or begin bearing children earlier, but
it is quite another to have a system in which the least educated and
poorest families are deployed to boost the reproduction rate. No
country's political system has appeared eager to go this route (and
where one has evolved in this way, in Israel, there was a subsequent
cutback of benefits53). On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a
political or tax system that does the opposite, which would be to limit
payments to well-educated women or (what might be the same thing)
to affluent families in order to boost the fertility rate of this hardest-
to-influence group. That leaves us with egalitarian subsidies and the
question of why countries in need of new blood do not pay more than
they do at present. The answer returns us to the politics of fertility.
Simply paying $25,000 per child, for example, (or per child after the
first child), produces a kind of moral hazard: it raises taxes on those
who are taxed most and who might, therefore, work more and have
fewer children, and it raises birth rates in the population that might
not be the target population for the political policy. It is also possible,
though perhaps hyper-rational to imagine, that they fear paying for
children who will simply depart before they are economically useful.
A country can substitute immigration for fertility to a degree; and, if
the immigration is not forthcoming, it may be foolhardy to pay for
fertility because the lack of ready immigrants signals that emigration
by indigenous citizens is a serious risk.
52 See A.J. Jowett, China: Population Change and Population Control, 1986
GEOJOURNAL, 349,356.
53 See Israel Women's Network: Women at Work-Know Your Rights at Work,
http://www.iwn.org.il/innerEn.asp?newsid=36 (last visited on Jul. 13, 2007) (discussing current
Israeli maternity leave policies).
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D. Private Insurance
If parental leave can be described, at least in part, as insurance,
then it is fair to ask why private insurance markets do not offer
coverage for the lost earnings associated with parental
responsibilities. This sort of coverage was unknown before the advent
of government mandated paid leave, and it is not currently available
as a supplement for lost earnings that exceed statutory caps. One can
imagine this sort of insurance packaged with heath care or pregnancy
insurance, so that the direct and indirect costs of childbirth would be
covered and coordinated in a single policy and with a single insurer.
But the imagined policy raises a serious adverse selection problem.
Many insureds have a good idea as to how many children they will
have, and the likelihood they will take time away from work after the
arrival of a child. The obvious way to defeat this problem, so that it
does not unravel the insurance market, is to require the policy to be
purchased when the insured has less information about the likelihood
of recovery. Toward this end, the insurance might be sold with a two
year waiting period, much as life insurance normally excludes suicide
for such a period.54 But here the waiting period provides a weak
solution because few potential buyers will have good estimates of
their future earnings. To cover lost earnings, insurance needs to be
purchased shortly before a loss; to avoid adverse selection, the
purchase needs to be long before. A better, but incomplete business
solution might be to limit recovery to earnings lost as a result of the
arrival of (at most) two children.
With or without constraints, parental leave "insurance" would be
more like a Christmas Club or an educational loan than most
insurance. Someone who earns $80,000 per year and sought insurance
as high as the generous Italian parental leave benefits, for example,
would need about $33,000 per child, or $66,000 for two children.55
The parties do not know whether they prefer, in essence, to create a
loan to be repaid after birth and leave, or a savings plan (somewhat
like whole-life insurance) that would accumulate up to the time of
parental leave. An insurer might simply charge a one-time premium
of $60,000 that could be paid in ten installments of $6,000 per year.
An insured who worked for five years and then left the workforce to
have and care for two children in a four year period would then return
to the workplace and resume payments for another five years. The
5 Note, Burden of Proof of Excepted Causes in Insurance Companies, 46 COLUM. L.
REV. 802, n.6 (1946).
55 See International Labour Organization, supra note 11 (discussing Italian parental leave
policies).
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policy would, in this way, start out as something close to a forced
savings plan, because 80-90% of insureds would be expected to
receive benefits, 56 and then look more like an educational loan
because there would be amounts to pay, with no security, out of later
earnings. 5 The overall picture, in any event, suggests that while such
private policies might emerge, they do not much resemble popular
insurance products.
The preceding thought experiment about private maternity leave
insurance makes plain that employer-mandated and government-
provided leaves are likely to involve substantial cross payments from
other employees or taxpayers. In a homogeneous population, these
plans can be understood as social insurance encompassing a kind of
life-cycle savings plan; the males and older workers who are forced to
participate are, for the most part, beneficiaries in due course. From
this perspective, even the most generous parental leave plans produce
very few serious winners or losers. If the leave is employer mandated,
there is, however, the danger of discrimination against younger
women at the time of hiring. Overall, it might be fair to say that while
many of the parental leave systems found around the world are ones
that some Americans-at particular points in their lives-envy, the
benefits are little more than loans that, for the most part, transfer from
our future selves to our younger, childbearing selves. For women who
have children closer to the end of their childbearing years, they are
savings policies, rather than loans. Most Americans who envy the
paid parental leaves found elsewhere probably miscalculate.
III. MORE ON VARIETY: TWO-TIER SYSTEMS AND PARENTAL LEAVE
A. Two-Tier Employment and Mandated Paid Leave
A final, secondary, explanation for the absence of paid parental
leave in the United States begins with the observation that there are
some remarkably generous leave programs, provided by employers,
and sometimes offered only to a class of employee. The idea here is
56 About 85% of women in Finland give birth to at least one child. In the United States,
the number might be higher. MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND HEALTH, OPPORTUNMES TO
RECONCILE FAMILY AND WORK, REPORTS OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND HEALTH
16, at 22 (Rolf Myhrman & Riitta Sdntti eds., 2007), 2007 at 25; Diedre A. Grossman,
Comment, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans in Italy and the United States: Differing Notions
of Gender Equality, 14 COMT. LAB. L.J. 185, 221 (1993).
57 The example ignores the time value of money. Given that the parties do not know
whether the leave will come early, in which case the insured ought to owe interest, or late in the
ten year period, in which case the insurer ought to pay interest, perhaps in the form of a lower
premium or higher benefits, the actuarially correct answer may be something close to ignoring
the time value of money.
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that in satisfying one set of employees, the employer-and eventually
the state-might face less pressure to develop a plan that benefits all.
Consider a large, successful law firm or university. Typically, staff
members can take maternity leave that builds on sick leave, disability
programs, and accrued vacation days. Employees might accumulate
two weeks for each year of employment, or perhaps receive a number
of weeks or months depending on years of service. A relatively
generous university policy is three months paid leave after three years
of employment, which we might think of as a term of employment, or
benefit, that adds pay to the federally mandated twelve weeks of
unpaid family leave.5 8 Another major university offers mothers 55%
of salary for six months, with a maximum of $800 per month.59
Another is less generous; staff receive ten days sick leave per year,
but that can be used only with medical certification, so that a typical
staff member might use two weeks of accrued sick pay following
birth and then move to short term disability (providing 60% pay) for
the balance of the thirteen-week-allowed-disability period.6 °
But at these universities, faculty receive greater benefits. A faculty
member who receives a term free of teaching, as is not uncommon,
can be thought of as receiving paid leave values somewhere between
one-quarter and one-half of annual salary. The uncertainty is a
product of the fact that the fraction of compensation attributable to
teaching, as opposed to other responsibilities (though some
universities will also suspend those for a term), is unstated.61
Similarly, attorney benefits at law firms are often greater than those
available to other employees.62 A survey of national law firms
suggests that the average lawyer can receive twelve weeks of fully-
58 Case Western Reserve University Human Resources, Case HR Policy Manual: Absence
and Leaves for Medical and Parenting Reasons, http://www.case.edu/finadmin/humres/
policies/absence.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2007).
59 University Of California Human Resources and Benefits, Short Term Disability
Insurance Plan, http://atyourservice.ucop.edu/formnspubs/eoc/disabilitymisuniv_2005.pdf,
(last visited Jul. 15, 2007).
60 The University of Chicago Benefits, Leaves of Absence http://hr.uchicago.edu/benefits/
spds/timeoff/leaves.htnl (last visited Jul. 15, 2007).
61 Compare Yale University Faculty Handbook, http://www.yale.edu/provost/handbook/
handbook viileaves of absence__univers.html#T13 (last visited Aug. 13, 2007), with Yale
University: Division of Finance, Policies & Procedures, http://apps.business.yale.edu/
ppdev/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 13, 2007).
62 Compare Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom: Attorney Recruiting,,
http://www.skadden.com/recruiting/recruitingContent.cfm?p=34 (follow "Competitive Salary
and Benefits Package" hyperlink) (last visited Jul. 16, 2007) (discussing its paid parental leave
policy for both primary and secondary care-givers), with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom: Support Staff, http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentlD=133 (last visited Jul. 16,
2007) (discussing its parental leave policy for support staff offering a base of 12 weeks unpaid
leave, with an option of applying 29 paid sick-days, in addition to 6 weeks paid leave for
mothers through the disability program).
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paid leave in addition to sick leave.63 Generally speaking, faculty at
universities and lawyers at law firms are likely to receive fully-paid
leave while other staff members are entitled to unpaid or fractionally-
paid leave. The parental benefit has, in many places, also been
extended to fathers, in part because of the shadow of
antidiscrimination law, but that benefit is also likely to be greater for
high-end employees. At one law school, for example, a faculty
member who is a new parent receives a semester free from teaching,
which we might assess as worth $50-$75,000, 64 though that faculty
member is asked to aver that he (or she) is the primary caregiver 65 -
perhaps just for the leave period. At the high end, there are law firms
that also provide a $50,000 to $60,000 benefit in the form of four
months at full pay for associates with new children.
In short, there are employers that offer a two-tier system, with
more generous benefits to more highly-paid employees. The two-tier
structure is not simply a product of higher salaries in the upper tier,
for the associate and faculty member receive a longer or much longer
period of paid leave.66 The young associate who receives $60,000
while on leave is plainly better off than she would be in most
European countries; but even the most the experienced secretary
would prefer the European benefits, leaving aside the question of how
these benefits affect wages or taxes.
It is tempting, as a next step, to theorize that the generous
mandates in Europe (and elsewhere) squeeze out the private market
for high-end benefits, while the two-tier private market system in the
United States forestalls the emergence of mandated paid leave. In the
first case, the argument would be that the mandates satisfy enough
employees, that there is not much push to provide higher benefits. In
the second case, the argument can be thought of as one drawing on
public choice tools, as it is concerned with interest group politics.
Employers have incentives to offer generous benefits, in lieu of cash,
to employees who value these benefits and who value the signal the
employer sends about its willingness to accommodate or attract
workers who expect to be parents. But once these employees are
satisfied, they have no incentive to work through the political process
63 See, e.g., interview by Tim Cleary with Jenna Boelke, Associate, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Jul. 28, 2007); see also, interview by Elizabeth Eldridge
with Brian Eldridge, Associate, Segal, McCambridge, Singer & Mahoney, in Chicago, I11. (Jul.
30, 2007) (discussing twelve-week long parental leave policies).
6 University of Virginia, Leaves of Absence, http://www.virginia.edu/provost/
docs_policies/leaves.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2007).
65 Id.
66 Compare Yale University Faculty Handbook, supra note 62, with Yale University:
Division of Finance, Policies & Procedures, supra note 62.
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for more generous leave policies for all employees. And yet it is
likely that the high-tier employees are, or could be, more powerful in
political terms. In the absence of employer-provided benefits, there
would be more political pressure for a social insurance or other
parental leave benefit. This perspective is fortified by the idea that
some well-organized segments of the lower-paid market, such as
members of some labor unions, do negotiate for more generous
private parental leave policies.67 They too have little incentive to
agitate for more generous mandated policies for others. They may
want to impose this on others so as not put their own firms or
industries in a poor competitive position. But, on the other hand, they
must fear that they will pay for these benefits with future, higher
taxes. It is also strengthened by the conjecture that in most industries
where we see generous benefits for high-end employees, immigration
can not easily fill the gap that parenting would create. Thus, lawyers
enjoy more leave than doctors and engineers.68
This theory about two-tier employment markets and the impact on
government mandates or programs raises the question of why such a
two-tier private market did not materialize in other countries, or at
least not in a way that forestalled the move to mandated and paid
parental leave. One answer might be that in these countries it is more
difficult or politically unacceptable to differentiate among employees.
High-tier employees in the U.S. also receive more paid vacation than
low-tier employees. In other countries, paid leave is often mandated
69for all employees.
B. Two-Tier Systems for Other Private and Public Goods
Two-tier benefits with respect to paid parental leave are not so
common as to form the basis for a convincing explanation of the
exceptional (which is to say, meager) parental leave provided by law
and even by private contract in the United States. There are many
industries where virtually all employees would receive greater
benefits, in the event of a birth of a child, in more than one hundred
other countries. Still, it is tempting to suggest that the prevalence of
67 Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in
Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1961-1962 (1999).
68 A survey of the websites of several well-known employers of engineers, physicians,
investment bankers, and lawyers suggests more generous benefits in the last professions. A
careful study of industries and leave policies is beyond the scope of this project.
69 See Richard N. Block, Work-Family Legislation in the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe: A Quantitative Comparison, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 333, 355 (2007) (discussing how
European countries mandate that employers provide paid vacation leave, while the United States
gives employers discretion regarding leave, so that there is more variety across employees).
218 [Vol. 58:1
PARENTAL LEAVE
two-tier systems in the United States makes us generally less inclined
to look to the government for mandates and benefits. Where we do
provide high-end redistribution and benefits, as in air quality,
workplace safety, and disability accommodations, it is noteworthy
that the benefit is something of a public good, so that two-tier
delivery is impossible or difficult. This is a topic to which I plan to
return in future work, but it is easy to see that, compared to other
countries, we offer two tiers of "benefits" when it comes to university
education and health care, much as we do with parental leave. And it
is possible that the presence of very fine-and expensive-public
schools and universities in some places causes a group of voters to
press less for better schools and universities elsewhere, or nationally.
Heterogeneity and mobility, and the availability of private market
alternatives, reduce pressure on the broad public provision of goods.
But this observation about quality and price differentials in the
United States does not by itself offer an explanation for the variety
that we find globally. In order to understand the two-tier system in the
United States and the single, high-end provision of these goods in
Sweden, say, we might need to argue that interest groups play
different roles in the two political systems. I do not pursue the topic
here-especially because the immediate subject of this Article,
parental leave policies, seems well explained by reference to fertility
and immigration rates.
IV. PARENTAL LEAVE, CHILD-CARE, AND EMPLOYEE RETENTION
A law firm that offers four months of paid parental leave to
associates is probably using parental leave as a means of recruiting in
the highly competitive market for graduates of elite law schools. In
the competition for these new attorneys, excellent parental leave
benefits are thought to be a powerful tool. Some support for this view
comes from the fact that where supply is more abundant, as it is for
paralegals and secretaries, the benefit is much more modest. On the
other hand, law firms and other enterprises face something of a crisis
in retaining associates, and especially women with children. 70 If
retention and not initial recruitment is-or becomes-the issue, then
generous parental leave policies, though fairly recently installed, will
not seem to have been well designed. In this Part, I aim to provide
some tentative thoughts on the future of parental leave and retention
strategies. In future work, I plan to discuss data and ideas about child-
70 See Panel Discussion: Women in Law, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 868 (2001) (discussing
the "glaring issues about female retention in large law firms").
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
care benefits and other strategies that might be described as
connecting family life to the workplace.
From an employer's point of view, the problem with parental
leave, and perhaps with paid leave, is that the employee has no
particular incentive to return to work after the period of leave. Indeed,
the leave itself may have informed the new parent that a life centered
on the home rather than the workplace has some rewards. Meanwhile,
the employer has held the job, but the employee has no legal
obligation to return to it. In some cases, the employer may be satisfied
with defection. If the promise of high-end parental leave attracts the
best applicants, the employer may thrive with the services of these
employees as long as they choose to remain at the firm. An employer
may believe, or learn through experience, that employees who depart
are simply not those it should wish, or induce, to remain. But what
about employers who do hope to retain employees after taking
parental leave? One obvious strategy would be to make paid parental
leave contingent on the employee's return to work. There is, however,
every reason to think that potential employees would be put off by
this policy. Moreover, there would be serious demoralization costs in
enforcement. Some employees might face real hardship, and some
births and children are easier to care for than others. It is unlikely that
the employer wants to be in the business of collecting refunds, or
deciding to collect otherwise forgivable loans, from ex-employees
who have recently left the firm to bear and care for children.
A second strategy would be to offer payments to employees for
childcare-instead of generous paid parental leave. For the employee
who returns to work, the value of the childcare subsidy at Firm A
might be expected to exceed the parental leave benefit at Firm B.
Prospective employees might therefore choose a firm with a high-end
child-care benefit over one with a high-end paid parental leave
benefit. They might even switch firms after taking the leave from the
first. Some firms have in fact invested in childcare; a modest number
of free days of childcare at a drop-off location or at any approved site
is a common benefit at law firms where unexpected and long hours
are the norm.71 It is plausible that the benefits we see at law firms and
investment banks, high on paid leave but with a much smaller
investment in child-care, are the product of history. Firms offered
71 See, e.g., Arnold & Porter LLP, Our Environment-Work/Life Programs,
http://www.amoldporter.com/recruiting.cfm (last visited Jul. 17, 2007) (offering on-site
childcare to associates at is Washington office); see also Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Legal
Recruiting, http://www.sullcrom.com/careers/legalrecruiting/compensationbenefits/ (last visited
Jul. 17, 2007) (offering a four week childcare leave in addition to a backup childcare center for
emergencies).
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paid leave to attract employees, especially when the competition for
exceptional women became intense. It now seems reckless to
restructure the benefit as a payment or bonus for returning to work for
a significant period. It is also difficult to pay more for less work
without incurring resentment on the part of other employees who
have not had children, or have not taken leave to do so. But more
significant payment for child-care seems like the next step in
employee retention policy. 72 A caveat is that parental leave, as we
have seen, can be given disproportionately to women, because a
significant part of that benefit can be structured as disability pay-in
which case there is no fear of an accusation of discrimination on the
basis of sex. A child-care benefit would presumably need to be
offered equally to male and female employees, and that is unattractive
to the firm if male employees value cash more than they value child-
care payments.
If it is difficult for employers to reduce paid leave, but paid leave
is thought an inferior strategy in terms of retention, then employers
might be expected to use bonuses to encourage retention and returns
from leaves. Future wage increases could be structured as bonuses,
earned in proportion to hours billed or available only to those on the
job. But bonuses that are structured in this way may bear lower value
in recruitment than does paid parental leave. The reason for this is
that, as described earlier, women are likely to overestimate the
number of children they will bear. If so, and especially if they do not
also overestimate the likelihood of returning to work, parental leave
will be valued more than bonuses or child-care benefits.
CONCLUSION
Parental leave can be thought of as a private good and as a public
good. It is a private good to the extent that we think of the decision to
bear children as private; we might also want to think of the decision
to spend time in or out of the workplace as private. Parental leave,
and other family-workplace policies, can be thought of as a public
good either because fertility rates are of collective concern or because
we think there is a social problem associated with highly trained
people (often educated at some public expense) leaving the work
force and not returning to it. If one takes the public good view,
perhaps because of a conviction that higher benefits yield more
children, better children, or working parents, then one should not be
entirely pleased with the recent development of significant paid
7 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison, LLP, Associate Life,
http://www.paulweisscareers.corm/associatelife/ (last visited Jul. 17, 2007).
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parental leave for professionals. After all, the two-tier system of
which this is a part probably reduces the political push for universal
paid leave of the kind found in most of the world.
If, however, we think of parental leave policy as it affects
individual fulfillment, then the message offered here is that the
policies found in the United States are likely the product of our robust
fertility and immigration rates-and that as far as the individual is
concerned, there is probably no need to envy the mandates found
elsewhere. An individual can set his or her own parental leave policy
by borrowing and saving, much as individuals borrow and save for
education. In large part, our system privatizes that which is done
publicly, but through higher taxes elsewhere. Fully-paid leave would
hardly redistribute wealth toward those with greater need, and so it is
not clear who should or would much prefer a national move in that
direction.
Finally, there is room for a view at the level of the firm, with an
eye on human capital. The claim here is that the focus will move from
recruitment to retention, unless prospective employees and parents
dramatically misestimate their own future choices. If change comes, it
is more likely to be in the form of an increase in child-care benefits
than it is in the form of universal paid parental leave.
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